# TRAFFIC STOP DATA ANALYSIS PROJECT THE CITY OF KALAMAZOO DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY

**Final Report for the
City of Kalamazoo
Department of Public Safety**

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## LAMBERTH CONSULTING

Lamberth Consulting was formed in 2000 in an effort to provide racial profiling assessment, training, and communication services to universities, states, counties, cities, civil rights groups, litigators, and communities. Lamberth Consulting provides the highest quality of services and solutions through objective, quantitative methods.

Dr. John C. Lamberth, CEO and founder of Lamberth Consulting, developed the nation's first racial profiling methodology in 1993. Since that time we have revised and adapted our methodology for highways, urban areas, suburban areas, and pedestrian populations. We have expanded our service offerings to include training solutions targeted towards law enforcement and community members, as well as communication planning services to help educate and inform all parties concerned about racial profiling issues.

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We would like to thank the Kalamazoo Department of Public Safety (KDPS) for their support and cooperation during the course of this study.   From the beginning of the effort, we were able to call upon the resources of the Department for the components that are necessary to complete a study of this nature.  For several months we had surveyors out on the streets of Kalamazoo at all hours of the day or night and KDPS provided security for them so they could concentrate on accurately recording the benchmark data.

We worked closely with members of the agency to understand traffic patterns and enforcement.  They provided us with information about police activity, special deployments, special circumstances within the City which influenced policing, and many other aspects of their work that would be necessary for us to understand when conducting this study.  We thank them for their willingness to share their knowledge of this jurisdiction with us.

The successful identification of benchmark locations and of stop data that accurately reflects traffic in that location is essential to the successful completion of a study of this sort. The personnel of the Department who were assigned to this project worked and shared their insight and experience with us and helped to make the study run smoothly. Completing a project of this magnitude in the time frame allotted required superior cooperation from the Department, which we greatly appreciate.

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we thank them.

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The past decade and a half has seen increased awareness of and concern with the treatment of minority motorists by police. The issue has generated interest among lawmakers, law enforcement agencies, and the communities in which they work and data collection efforts have begun in many jurisdictions. Some efforts are due to threats of litigation or settlements; others have been legislatively mandated, while still others have been voluntary in nature. The Kalamazoo Department of Public Safety (KDPS) data collection efforts fall into this latter category.

Collecting traffic stop data is of little use unless a meaningful analysis of that data is conducted. If the analysis demonstrates that stop practices are unbiased, then the agency should ensure that community members and other stakeholders are aware of this and the agency and officers should be congratulated for this fact. If the analysis demonstrates that issues exist that may be caused by bias, then the agency should commit real resources to the issue, and seek to change the behaviors that led to this concern.

One of the major issues in data analysis to date has been in determining the appropriate benchmark or standard to which the stop data are to be compared. The methodology employed in this study is one that has been employed in several studies across the country, as well as being relied upon by Courts. This methodology employs what we believe to be the only appropriate benchmark for such an analysis; that is, a direct measure of the transient populations (driving populations) in specific locations spread throughout the city. This allows a comparison of racial/ethnic groups as they are represented in the transient population to police stops of those groups.

The study for KDPS addressed the following questions:

- Is there evidence of targeting of minority motorists in traffic stops conducted by the KDPS?

- Which minority groups (i.e., Blacks and Hispanics), if any, are targeted?

- In which locations is targeting of any group likely to occur?

- Are Black and/or Hispanic drivers treated in a similar fashion after the stop occurs?

KDPS began collecting stop data in late 2011. To accomplish this they had to develop a software package and test it at the end of 2011 and the first 2 months of 2012. The data utilized for analysis were collected between March 1, 2012 and February 28, 2013. Data on the transient traffic population were collected at 12 locations throughout the city in the fall of 2011. We have found that the racial/ethnic demographics of the traffic are stable throughout the year. The 12 locations for the deployed analysis were selected due to the high number of stops at each, traffic patterns that were relatively representative of the jurisdiction[1], as well as accessibility for surveyors. Traffic surveys were conducted on randomly selected days and times at each location and were conducted over a two-month period by highly trained surveyors. These surveys provided the benchmark data to which stop data was compared.

Black motorists are stopped at a higher rate than would be expected by their presence in traffic. This higher rate varies from about 1.5 times as likely as a non-Black motorist to be stopped at Kilgore and Milham Park to 2.98 times as likely to be stopped as a non-Black motorist at Park and Patterson. The weighted (based on the number of stops at each location) average for all locations was 2.32, which indicates that targeting of African American motorists is occurring.

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[1] Every effort was made to benchmark locations in all Police Districts in Kalamazoo.

The odds ratio is best understood by filling in the ratio in the following sentence. "If you are Black /(Hispanic), you are _____ times as likely to be stopped than if you are not Black. If no racial targeting were occurring, all of the ratios would be 1.0. This would mean that Blacks (or any other group) are no more likely to be stopped than non-Blacks. The other 9 benchmark locations that had sufficient stops to analyze, with their odds ratios are as follows:

1. Burdick & Richards            1.63
2. Cork & Redmond               2.38
3. Kalamazoo & Westnedge        2.66
4. KL & Little                  1.85
5. Main & Catherine             2.29
6. Michigan & Lafayette         1.64
7. Portage & Stockbridge        1.96
8. Stadium & Rambling           1.70
9. Whites & Bronson             2.13

Relative to the percentage of Black motorists stopped fewer are given citations, more are asked to exit the vehicle and searched, and considerably more Black motorists are handcuffed and arrested than are stopped. However, when we look at the percentage of motorists who are carrying contraband, we find that Black motorists are searched most--by quite a large amount-- and are least likely to be carrying contraband. This is true whether we view these numbers in relation to their presence among those stopped and searched and even more so their presence in traffic[2].

By contrast Hispanic motorists were stopped slightly less often than would be expected by their presence in traffic. With regard to each of the post stop activities (citations, asked to exit

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[2] We do not have an accurate measure of Black traffic citywide. We do know what the Black traffic is at the 12 locations that were benchmarked. Given the data we have, it is probably safe to say that Black motorists make up approximately 20% of the traffic around the city.

vehicle, handcuffed, searched and arrested) Hispanics were subjected to these at about the same rate as they were stopped.

This is a time of reflection and concern for the KDPS, the African American Community and indeed, the whole city of Kalamazoo. It is also an exciting and promising time if the KDPS and the community coalesce and realize that the results of the study are important primarily as a springboard towards moving forward.

The leadership of KDPS and the City of Kalamazoo has made it clear to us that targeting of Black motorists is unacceptable and must change. They have been insistent that they want Lamberth Consulting to make recommendations that will ultimately lead to lasting change in the way KDPS conducts stops of its citizens and views/ treats the African American population in Kalamazoo. To an extent that we have not seen in the numerous police departments for which we have conducted assessments over the last 15 years, Kalamazoo leaders are open to changing the way they conduct themselves.

First and foremost, the community and KDPS should understand that the most important change that must occur is in the culture of KDPS. KDPS is not unique among police departments in the United States in that they share societal stereotypes about African American citizens. The first step in changing police culture means that all policies and procedures of the department must be carefully reviewed and assessed for bias against African Americans specifically and all persons generally, either explicit or implicit. For example, KDPS officers choose to search approximately 6% of the motorists they stop and the majority of them are African American. KDPS should carefully review its policy on searches and assure that there are objective criteria required as a threshold for initiating high officer discretion searches.

Equally or possibly even more important, is the requirement that the agency clearly and consistently communicate to all members of KDPS that, moving forward, the KDPS culture will be defined as much by the changes to department protocols, including revisions to policies and procedures as by its rich history. The KDPS system of rewards and recognition (formal and informal) must be included in the overall agency evaluation and change effort. We say this to emphasize the fact that, in our view, the culture of a police department is so powerful that it overcomes the influence of the cultures from which its officers come. To change the culture of KDPS, the entire agency, including the Chief, the Command Staff, the public safety officers, front line supervisors and possibly most important of all its Field Training Officers must commit to examining every aspect of the organization, challenging traditional processes, practices and assumptions and implementing and sustaining all necessary changes.

The culture of KDPS has been developed over many years and changes to it will not be accomplished overnight. The City of Kalamazoo and KDPS have committed to changing the culture and it is important that the citizens of Kalamazoo, particularly the African American citizens give them time to do so.

# INTRODUCTION

For decades representatives from minority groups, particularly Black[3] and Hispanic motorists, have provided anecdotal evidence of racial/ethnic targeting by law enforcement agencies on the roadways of our country. The specific measurement of the practice, however, was not formalized until 1994. During the criminal litigation case in New Jersey (*State v. Soto et al.*), a group of defendants alleged that New Jersey State troopers were targeting and stopping Black motorists on the highway, not because of their driving behavior, but because of the color of their skin. During the course of this case the race and ethnicity of the driving population was observed and recorded on portions of the New Jersey Turnpike[4]. The driving population then was compared to the racial and ethnic makeup of the individuals stopped in New Jersey to determine whether a disproportionate percentage of minority drivers were being stopped relative to their presence on the roadway. This method was also used in Maryland (Lamberth, 1996), during the civil litigation case (*Wilkins v. Maryland State Police*) in which Robert Wilkins alleged that the rental car driven by his cousin on the Maryland State highway was stopped and searched by a drug-sniffing dog due to a "profile" prepared by the Maryland State Police which included Black males driving rental cars.

In the former case, the courts held for the defendants. The latter case was settled, and the issue of racial profiling began to develop greater national attention and exposure. It is important to note that the early work performed in this field, while groundbreaking, was limited due to the fact that it was conducted within the context of litigation. That is, the issue was reviewed in a

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[3] Throughout this report we refer to Black or African American motorists , using the term interchangeably. By this we mean people of Black appearance.
[4] Lamberth, J. Revised Statistical Analysis…(1994) Available at
http://www.lamberthconsulting.com/downloads/new_jersey_study_report.pdf

combative forum between community and law enforcement participants. The work was completed slowly, and dialogue surrounding the science was limited. In the late 1990's, a dramatic shift began to take place resulting from state legislation, police agency participation and leadership relative to this science. Since then, state legislatures have mandated data collection, and/or developed laws prohibiting racial profiling by law enforcement agencies. By 2008, 26 states had enacted legislation relative to this issue, and police agencies in all but 3 states have undertaken efforts due to mandate, decree, or of their own volition. Several significant events have occurred nationally which have influenced this proactive shift in focus, and have helped to direct activities in this field.

In June 1999, the Department of Justice (DOJ) hosted a conference on "Strengthening Police-Community Relationships." This conference recognized that police are more effective when they have the trust and cooperation of the residents in their community. However, in many communities, especially minority communities, a lack of trust exists between law enforcement and local residents. This tension is exacerbated by allegations of police misconduct such as racial profiling.

The conference highlighted the need to identify and implement proactive police practices that build trust, enhance police integrity and reduce police misconduct. Members at the conference determined that collecting data on traffic and pedestrian stops, analyzing this data, and providing the results for public review can help shift debates on racial profiling from anecdotal reports to informed discussions. By being proactive about recognizing and addressing racial profiling, police and communities can go a long way towards managing perceptions around racial profiling and strengthening police-community relationships.

In February 2000, the DOJ held a conference entitled "Traffic Stops and Data Collection: Analyzing and Using the Data." In this conference, more than 75 federal, state and local police administrators, prosecutors, civil rights advocates, government officials, police labor leaders, researchers, and community leaders gathered to examine the collection, analysis and use of data on traffic, pedestrian and other law enforcement stops. Collectively the participants reached several conclusions:

- Traffic stop data collection systems are needed to respond to the perceptions of racial profiling, to measure their reality, and to bridge the gap between minorities and police.

- Core data elements of traffic stop systems should include: date and time, location, race and ethnicity, gender, reasons for initiating the stop, actions taken by the officer, and duration of the encounter.

- Benchmarks for comparing data collected on stops are essential for conducting valid analyses. Without valid control groups, supportable statistical analyses are not possible.

- Data that is complete, accurate and truthful is critical.

- Analysis of data must be conducted by a capable and credible party.

- Publicizing traffic stop data can help to build trust between public law enforcement agencies and the public.

In August 2001, under a DOJ grant, the Police Executive Research Forum held a conference for leading researchers in the field to discuss issues relating to benchmarking for stop data collection and analysis. The conference was attended by social scientists, legal scholars and practitioners from several police departments across the nation. This conference was the first of its kind to bring leading scientists and researchers together to discuss the best methods for analyzing stop data.

In March 2003, the Soros Foundation provided support for a conference on racial profiling that was co-hosted by the Institute on Race and Justice at Northeastern University, the American Civil Liberties Union, the National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives, and Lamberth Consulting. The Conference, "Confronting Racial Profiling in the 21$^{st}$ Century: Implications for Racial Justice," featured 30 of the leading researchers in the country. The intent of this conference was to bring together researchers, law enforcement agencies and community representatives to collectively review the latest and most progressive methods for stop data collection and analysis. The conference also focused on post-stop activity, community engagement, and data auditing as primary subject topics.

In November 2003, the Northwestern University Center for Public Safety and the Police Executive Research Forum held the Third National Symposium on Racial Profiling. The third day of that conference was given over to discussing issues of data collection and analysis. Specifically issues of risk management, benchmarking, post-stop activity, and related topics were reviewed. Observational benchmarks, which were pioneered by Lamberth Consulting, were cited as the most used and reliable of the strong benchmarks discussed.

In February 2004, the Community Oriented Policing Services of the Department of Justice (COPS) sponsored the Western Regional Racially Biased Policing Summit in conjunction with the City of Sacramento and the Sacramento Police Department. This conference explored benchmarking, post- stop analyses, community police engagement, training and a variety of other issues integral to the racial profiling debate.

In the summer of 2004, Community Oriented Policing Services of the Department of Justice funded two workshops that were hosted by the Police Executive Research Forum on the assessment of Racial Profiling and the best practices for conducting assessments.

In January 2005, the Open Justice Initiative hosted a workshop in Budapest, Hungary in which ethnic profiling was considered an issue in several European countries.  Dr. John Lamberth presented a paper on the methodology utilized in the United States that allowed for the scientific study of racial profiling.  Among other things this initiative led to a monograph "Ethnic Profiling by Police in Europe" and a study of ethnic profiling in the Moscow metro system.[5]

In 2007, The Open Society Justice Initiative in connection with the CESDIP, a French Research Institution devoted to the study of criminal justice and deviance, and Lamberth Consulting conducted a study of the Paris Police activities with regard to the stopping of civilians in Paris.  This resulted in a monograph *Profiling Minorities: A Study of Stop and Search Practices in Paris,* published in 2009, which detailed the targeting of Black and Arabs by the Paris Police.

In 2009, the Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety and Security engaged Lamberth Consulting and The Rendon Group in Boston to prepare the first training modules designed for both police and community members on the subject of biased policing.  Those training modules can be viewed at:

www.mass.gov/eopss/law-enforce-andcj/law-enforce/faip/faip-training-materials.html

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[5] Ethnic Profiling in the Moscow Metro. (2006). Open Society Institute, New York, N.Y.

In 2011, John Jay College of Criminal Justice hosted a "Roundtable on Current Debates, Research Agendas and Strategies to Address Ethnic/Racial Profiling in the UK and USA".  This meeting of police and research experts discussed and contributed to a deeper understanding of the issue in both the United States and the UK.

From these and other conferences, a central and critical focus has become clear.  To manage public perception about racial profiling and to strengthen community-policing relationships, the methods used for collecting and analyzing stop data is critical.  Two primary components must be in place to determine whether racial profiling is occurring:  benchmarks and complete stop data.

## *BENCHMARKS*

When a police department develops stop data that designates the race/ethnicity of each motorist stopped, the next necessary ingredient for accurately analyzing that data is the data against which to compare the stops.  This has been termed the "denominator" issue by some, but we prefer to refer to this comparison data as the "benchmark".  Knowing that a police department stops 50% Black motorists does not tell us anything about whether they are targeting Black motorists until we know *how many* Black motorists are driving on the streets and highways patrolled by that police department. Only then are we in a position to assert that police are stopping too many Black motorists, about the right percentage, or too few.

Some researchers in the late 1990's and early 2000's opined that census data might estimate driving populations reasonably well.  Studies were conducted for individual jurisdictions and for some states using census data as the primary data set for benchmarks.

Examples include San Diego[6], Connecticut[7] and Texas Departments of Public Safety[8], 2000.

These data were also attractive to other organizations, such as newspapers, which had easy

access to census data. Journalists for newspapers reported on simple percentage comparisons of

stop data against census data estimates, often claiming that these differences indicated racial

profiling. The field has since learned that census data do not provide a good estimate of driving

populations. Today, experienced researchers argue against the use of these data[9], citing for

example, that census data alone do not account for driving populations such as commuter traffic,

university populations and tourists.

The benchmark that has both been relied upon by courts in reaching decisions *(Soto,

1996; Wilkins, 1996; Foulkes, 2000)* and utilized by other researchers in attempting to validate

possible alternative benchmarks[10] (Alpert, Smith & Dunham, 2003, Farrell, et al., 2004) is

observations of traffic. Observational surveys of specific locations are reliable measures of the

traffic from which police officers select motorists to stop at that location and thus are appropriate

benchmarks.

## *Violators*

One question facing those attempting to analyze traffic stop data involves the selection of

the most appropriate stop data to use for comparison. A number of measures have been used in

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[6] Cordner, et al. (2001) Vehicle stops in San Diego, 2001. Available at
http://www.sandiego.gov/police/pdf/stoprpt.pdf
[7] Cox, et al. (2001) Interim report of traffic stops statistics for the state of Connecticut. Available at:
http://www.ocjc.state.or.us/Racial_Profiling/ct.pdf
[8] Traffic Stop Data Report, 2001. Available at:
http://www.txdps.state.tx.us/director_staff/public_information/trafrep2001totals.pdf
[9] Fridell, L. (2004) By the Numbers. Available at:
http://www.policeforum.org/upload/BytheNumbers%5B1%5D_715866088_12302005121341.pdf;
Farrell, et al. (2005). Learning from Research and Practice. Available at:
http://www.racialprofilinganalysis.neu.edu/IRJ_docs/Report_NewChallenges21.pdf
[10] Alpert, et al. (2003) The Utility of Not at Fault Traffic Crash Data in Racial Profiling Research.
Farrell, et al. (2003) The Driving Population Estimate Available at:
http://www.racialprofilinganalysis.neu.edu/IRJ_docs/Report_NewChallenges21.pdf

the research to date and an open question remains as to whether using estimates of the population violating traffic laws is an improvement over estimates of drivers operating on a community's roadways. Courts (beginning with the *Soto* and *Wilkins* decisions) have said violators represent the appropriate measure, but then quickly changed their focus when it became obvious that the two were virtually synonymous.

Court decisions uniformly support the notion that any motorist violating a traffic law is subject to being stopped by police and are the appropriate group to benchmark. However, to date, empirical evidence supports the contention that traffic and violators are synonymous, and in the *Soto* case the Court essentially used traffic and violators interchangeably.

The first scientific measurement of the appropriate comparison number for traffic stops determined both the proportion of Black motorists in the traffic stream, and those violating at least one traffic law (*New Jersey v. Soto, et al.*). In *Soto* and subsequently *Wilkins v. Maryland State Police* virtually every motorist was speeding (98.3% in *Soto* and 93.3% in *Wilkins*). More recently, Lamberth (2003)[11] reported a study in which police officers were given five minutes to determine whether randomly selected cars were violating a traffic law. The study concluded that fully 94% of the drivers were violating some law, and it took a mean of 28 seconds for the officers to spot the violation.

For the reasons stated above, and due to constraints on resources, in Kalamazoo we have used the traffic estimates as our benchmark. However, we should note that direct research measuring differences between racial or ethnic groups and driving behavior is very limited. While empirical evidence suggests that traffic violators and traffic motorists are virtually

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[11] Lamberth, John, "Measuring the racial/ethnic makeup of traffic: The how, what and why." Paper presented at *Confronting Racial Profiling in the 21st Century: Implications for Racial Justice.* Boston, March, 2003.

identical, a question remains as to whether one racial or ethnic group is more likely to violate

traffic laws egregiously than another.  That is, it is theoretically possible, while perhaps not

intuitive, that one racial or ethnic group is more likely to speed excessively, or drive vehicles

with severe vehicle code violations, or run traffic lights more often, etc.  To date, empirical

evidence is scant and mixed on this issue of whether one racial/ethnic group or another violates

traffic laws more egregiously than others.  Two studies commissioned by state police agencies

have found that minorities, and particularly Black motorists, violate speeding laws more

egregiously than do White motorists.  Both of these studies considered excessive speeding

(defined as 15 mph above the limit) as the egregious violation to be studied.  These studies have

been severely criticized on methodological grounds.[12]   Kadane & Lamberth[13] found that, while

slightly more Black motorists apparently violate the speeding laws more egregiously than do

other groups, the differences are small and are likely caused, at least in part, by the fact that there

appear to be more young Black motorists on the roadway than young White motorists.  Further,

in a recent report of traffic stops in an urban area, Lamberth[14]  found that there was no difference

in the speeding behavior by race/ethnicity.

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[12] Lange, et al utilized pictures of motorists who were speeding 15 miles per hour (mph) or more over the speed limit.  The major criticism of this study is the large percentage of pictures that could not be reliably classified as to the race of the driver.  When the criterion was 2 out of 3 raters agreeing on the race of the driver, 32% of the pictures could not be classified.  When all three raters had to agree, 60% of the data was unusable.  Engle, et al. also argued that Black drivers and what they called non-Caucasian drivers (which included Hispanics many of whom are Caucasian) were more likely to be speeding at least 15 mph above the speed limit than were White drivers.  This study suffered from, among other things, the fact that 1) only drivers who were not in a group were selected to be measured as to their speed, 2) counties in Pennsylvania were not selected randomly for inclusion, 3) after 20 counties were chosen to be included in the study an additional 7 counties were added and these new additions were much more likely to have Blacks and non-Caucasians as egregious speeders, and 4) the data underlying the study are not available to other researchers.

[13] Kadane, J. B. & Lamberth, J. Are blacks egregious violators at extraordinary rates in New Jersey? *Law, Probability & Risk, 2009.*

[14] Traffic Stop Data Analysis Project of the Sacramento Police Department, 2008.  This report is available at http://www.cityofsacramento.org/crpc/documents/SacramentoPoliceDepartmentFinalReport_8-7-08.pdf

## METHODOLOGY: OVERVIEW

The methodology used in this study has been developed and refined based upon experience with similar efforts in determining if racial targeting is occurring in the states of Arizona, California, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, Texas and the District of Columbia (*State of New Jersey v. Soto*,[15] *Wilkins v. Maryland State Police*,[16] *Arizona v. Folkes*[17]) and through our experience in working with national leaders on this issue in US DOJ conferences and work sessions. We believe the most effective approach is a holistic one that includes the assessment of racial targeting, intervention to train officers, and to improve processes and behaviors if the problem exists.  One of the most crucial elements is communication with the stakeholder communities and groups that are affected by the practice.

Unfortunately, it is not possible to conduct benchmarking in every location of a city or highway to assess whether one racial/ethnic group or another is being stopped too often compared to their presence in traffic. Therefore, the logic of our work, elemental to statistical analysis in other contexts, is to sample certain portions of city drivers on randomly selected days and times of day. This deployed methodology enables the generalization of the study's results to the police department's activity in the areas that we examine. The determination of locations to assess in a city is necessarily determined by traffic patterns and police activity in that city.  To assure the greatest generalization possible, days and times of day are selected randomly.  In this study, we designated 12 specific locations within the city of Kalamazoo to be assessed.

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[15] *State v. Pedro Soto*, A. 734A. 2d 350(N.J. Super: Ct. Law Div. 1996)
[16] *Wilkins v. Maryland State Police, et al.*, Civ. No MJG-93-468
[17] *State v. Barrington Folkes, et al.*

The benchmarks at these locations were then compared to the stops at these locations. To be specific, all stops that occurred within a small area pre-specified by consultation with the Kalamazoo Department of Public Safety (KDPS) were used in the comparison to the benchmark.

## *Site Selection*

In observational benchmark work in urban/suburban areas, specific intersections are selected for surveying generally based upon high police activity (known as a deployed analysis), with a specified perimeter (polygon) drawn around them. We worked with the KDPS to determine which specific locations to survey. The factors that went into these decisions are provided below:

- Location of agency stop activity gathered from a review of stops during 2011 (with some reference to 2010)

- Computer-Aided Dispatch (CAD) data on police stops

- Utilization of  newly designed and implemented software for data collection

- Local demographics at reviewed locations (businesses, schools, etc.)

- Traffic (motorist and/or pedestrian) patterns and volume

- Suitability of site for surveying (safe surveying areas, ambient lighting)

After comparing the list of the top locations for stops made by KDPS in 2010 and 2011, 22 locations were carefully reviewed for suitability. During these site reviews, a composite of the locations was developed recording landmarks and apparent lighting (direct lighting from streetlamps, and ambient lighting from nearby businesses), street direction and number of lanes and by conducting traffic counts to estimate traffic volume.

The locations chosen for the analysis were:

1. Burdick & Richards
2. Cork & Redmond
3. Kilgore & Milham Park
4. KL & Little
5. Lovers Lane & Sunnock
6. Main & Catherine
7. Michigan & Lafayette
8. Park & Patterson
9. Portage & Stockbridge
10. Stadium & Rambling
11. Westnedge & Kalamazoo
12. Whites & Bronson

## *Surveyor Training*

Teams of surveyors were hired and trained to visually identify and manually record the race and ethnicity of individuals who comprise the transient populations.    The initial training session was held in September, 2011 and was attended by surveyors, members of the community and representatives of KDPS.   Training was conducted by Dr. Lamberth and the project manager, Simone Riggs.  Immediately following the initial training presentation, surveyors were taken to several locations and were allowed to practice the activity while asking questions and being given on the job training.

Survey training is critical to ensure that surveyors understand the surveying process, surveyor positioning, daytime and nighttime surveying guidelines, data recording procedures, quality assurance reviews such as the assessment of inter-rater reliability, and the data cataloguing steps required for this work.  Simone Riggs and Dr. Lamberth worked together during this session to assure that survey management tasks such as status reporting, interacting

with police department personnel, and supervising surveyors were fully implemented. The

survey training consisted of:

1. A high-level overview of the purpose of the Kalamazoo study. The intent of this portion of the training was to provide surveyors with a basic understanding of the importance of the study and the critical role that they would play.

2. An explanation of the survey method, schedule and roles were discussed, and the survey procedures were diagrammed and reviewed. The intent of this portion of the training was to provide surveyors with a basic understanding of how the survey would be conducted.

3. Hands-on practice in the field in which surveyors practiced on location, using the actual data sheets developed for the survey. During this portion of the training, guidance was provided on data capture and review, and feedback was given to surveyors on the methods and tips for positioning and data recording. Surveyor data sheets were reviewed, and feedback was provided on performance. The intent of this portion of the training was to provide surveyors a chance to practice in a "consequence-free" environment before conducting the actual survey. Inter-rater reliability coefficients were computed to ensure that surveyors were trained to criterion[18].

4. Simone Riggs was available throughout the surveying to assist surveyors in determining driving routes, driving timing, break timing, and survey protocol. In addition she was in contact with representatives of KDPS to assure the smooth functioning of the surveys.

5. Surveyors for all sessions were accompanied by a KDPS officer who provided security and lighting during all sessions where the ambient lighting was insufficient for accurate recognition of the race/ethnicity of motorists.

## *Benchmarks Compared to Census Data*

As previously described, in the 1990's many people opined that census data would be a

good benchmark against which to compare police stop data.  However, as research in the area

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[18] A minimum inter-rater reliability coefficient (i.e., the percent of agreement between two surveyors observing the same car at the same time) of .80 was used as this criterion. This is a commonly accepted standard in social science research.

has increased, it has become increasingly apparent that census data are inappropriate. Figure 1

shows a comparison of the disparity between the percentage of minorities driving at specific

locations in urban areas in 14 cities/counties in 4 states and the District of Columbia and the

percentage of minorities living in the census tracts that encompass those areas. To be more

specific, observational data was collected at 220 intersections in those 14 cities/counties and

compared with census tract information for the percentage of minorities living at those locations.

In every instance, the comparison included Black motorists/residents and additional data on

Hispanic and Asian motorists/residents collected at many of the locations as well.  In all, the

figure includes 511 comparisons between minority drivers and minority residents. The figure

shows how close/far off census data were in predicting the driving population.



**Figure 1.  The amount of error associated with predicting the driving population
from census data.**

The story that these data tell is that census data are over 40% off the mark over a third of

the time and it is not possible to know whether census data will over or under estimate the

driving  population.

We now turn to data from Kalamazoo. Observations were made at 12 locations in

Kalamazoo and we will report on the percentage of Black drivers compared to residents in those

twelve locations. The results are seen in Table 1.

| No. | Location | Black Census | Black Benchmark | Comparative Disparity[19] |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Burdick & Richards | 22.6% | 27.9% | -23.5% |
| 2 | Cork & Redmond | 8.8% | 14.4% | -63.6% |
| 3 | Kalamazoo & Westnedge | 19.8% | 23.1% | -16.7% |
| 4 | Kilgore & Milham Park | 12.3% | 8.7% | 29.3% |
| 5 | KL & Little | 9.8% | 14.6% | -49.0% |
| 6 | Lovers Lane & Sunnock | 12.3% | 15.6% | -26.8% |
| 7 | Main & Catherine | 18.3% | 14.6% | 20.2% |
| 8 | Michigan & Lafayette | 9.8% | 11.6% | -18.4% |
| 9 | Park & Patterson | 79.4% | 43.5% | 45.1% |
| 10 | Portage & Stockbridge | 30.3% | 24.5% | 52.1% |
| 11 | Stadium & Rambling | 11.5% | 12.6% | -9.6% |
| 12 | Whites & Bronson | 7.2% | 9.1% | -26.4% |

**Table 1. Comparison of Black Census and Observation Benchmarks at Deployed Areas Utilized in the Study.[20]**

As can be seen from Table 1, census underestimates the race of drivers at 8 of the

intersections and overestimates it at 4. These data continue to show that the use of census data as

a benchmark would result in erroneous conclusions.

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[19] The comparative disparity is computed by subtracting the benchmark percentage from the census percentage of the minority group and dividing by the census percentage. Therefore, a negative comparative disparity means that the minority is underrepresented by census data when compared to traffic.
[20] The percentages are for those individuals 16 and above.

Table 2 presents the comparable data for Hispanic motorists/residents.

| No. | Location | Hispanic Census | Hispanic Benchmark | Comparative Disparity[21] |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Burdick & Richards | 14.5% | 5.4% | 62.8% |
| 2 | Cork & Redmond | 5.4% | 5.3% | 1.9% |
| 3 | Kalamazoo & Westnedge | 2.9% | 3.6% | -24.1% |
| 4 | Kilgore & Milham Park | 4.2% | 2.6% | 38.1% |
| 5 | KL & Little | 4.4% | 2.7% | 38.6% |
| 6 | Lovers Lane & Sunnock | 4.2% | 8.6% | -102.4% |
| 7 | Main & Catherine | 4.6% | 2.0% | 56.5% |
| 8 | Michigan & Lafayette | 4.4% | 2.0% | 54.6% |
| 9 | Park & Patterson | 5.8% | 2.9% | 50.0% |
| 10 | Portage & Stockbridge | 11.5% | 8.7% | 24.3% |
| 11 | Stadium & Rambling | 6.7% | 2.2% | 67.2% |
| 12 | Whites & Bronson | 2.6% | 2.1% | 19.2% |

**Table 2.  Comparison of Hispanic Census and Observation Benchmarks at Deployed Areas Utilized in the Study.[22]**

For Hispanic motorists census data underestimates the actual traffic at 10 of the 12 locations and

 overestimates it at two.

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[21] The comparative disparity is computed by subtracting the benchmark percentage from the census percentage of the minority group and dividing by the census percentage.  Therefore, a negative comparative disparity means that the minority is underrepresented by census data when compared to traffic.

[22] The percentages are for those individuals 16 and above.

## *Stop Data*

The stop data for this study were collected between March 1, 2012 and Feb. 28, 2013. They represent a full year of police stop activity. Prior to the conclusion of data collection, Lamberth Consulting met with representatives of the KDPS and carefully drew perimeters around each benchmark location taking into consideration traffic patterns and flow. The aim of that exercise was to make sure that traffic measured at each benchmark location was represented by stops in the outlined area. Each benchmark location and the area of stops that were used to conduct statistical analysis are presented in the Appendix. In the results section of this report we present a comparison of the race/ethnicity of motorists stopped at each area benchmark location compared to the race/ethnicity of motorists driving at that location.

During the course of this project, it became apparent that extracting the data from the Computer Assisted Dispatch software used by KDPS was impractical. Discussions between Lamberth Consulting and KDPS resulted in KDPS instituting a specific software program for the stop data collection. KDPS and the City of Kalamazoo were willing to expend the resources necessary to acquire this program and have it available for ongoing stop data collection. Therefore, KDPS has the ability to continue collecting data. In fact, those data collection efforts continue as this report is being written.

The "odds ratio" is the statistic that Lamberth Consulting used to report police stops to benchmark expectations. The odds ratio is best understood by filling in the ratio in the following sentence: "If you are Black /(Hispanic), you are _____ times as likely to be stopped than if you are not Black." If no racial targeting were occurring, all of the ratios would be 1.0. This would mean that Blacks (or any other group) are no more likely to be stopped than non-Blacks.

## *Post Stop Activity*

After the police officer has stopped a motorist, there are a number of things that can and do occur. Most often, the motorist is apprised of why the stop was made, a citation or a warning is issued and the motorist and police officer go their separate ways. However, there are a variety of actions the police officer can take during the stop beyond the basics just discussed. Citations can be issued, the motorist can be asked to exit the vehicle and/or handcuffed for one reason or another, a search of the driver, passengers or vehicle can be conducted and the motorist can be arrested. The goal of a post stop activity analysis is to determine if motorists of different race/ethnicities are differentially subjected to these types of additional actions.

The analysis of post stop activities is somewhat more complex than the analysis of stops, particularly where stops in a specific location are compared to traffic in that same location. The starting point for analyzing post stop activity is the proportion of motorists of a specific race/ethnicity who were stopped by KDPS. Then we must be cognizant of the number of police assigned to that area where the stop occurred and the unit to which the officer was assigned. These latter two variables are important because more police are generally assigned to areas of the city where more police activities are required. This can range from high traffic areas to high crime areas. Police, particularly in high crime areas, are expected to combat that crime and one of the ways they accomplish this is through investigative activities including traffic stops. Investigative traffic stops are likely to include more post stop activities in the course of the investigation. Officers assigned to investigative activities generally conduct more post stop activities than do officers in other types of units. All of these variables need to be taken into consideration when analyzing post stop activity.

## RESULTS

KDPS officers stopped more African American motorists than would be expected on the basis of the benchmarks at all 11 of the benchmark locations that recorded enough stops for analysis[23]. The odds ratios, which was earlier explained as being best understood by filling in the ratio in the following sentence: "If you are Black/(Hispanic, Asian) you are _____ times as likely to be stopped than if you are not Black." Recall if no racial targeting were occurring, all of the ratios would be 1.0. This would mean that Blacks (or any other group) are no more likely to be stopped than Blacks. Table 3 provides the proportion of Blacks stopped and the benchmarks at that location. It should be noted that we have described an odds ratio of 1 to 1.5 as benign, an odds ratio of 1.5 to 2 as indicating that the department should be concerned and an odds ratio above 2 as indicating that targeting is occurring.

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[2323] One location, Lovers Lane and Sunnock had too few stops by officers to analyze.

| Location | Benchmark N | Benchmark % Black | Stop N | Stop % Black | Disparity | Odds Ratio |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Burdick & Richards | 569 | 27.9% | 788 | 38.7% | 10.8% | 1.63 |
| Cork & Redmond | 1066 | 14.4% | 203 | 28.6% | 14.2% | 2.38 |
| Kalamazoo & Westnedge | 1514 | 23.1% | 3402 | 44.4% | 21.3% | 2.66 |
| Kilgore & Milham Park | 1270 | 8.7% | 160 | 12.5% | 3.8% | 1.50 |
| KL & Little | 1620 | 14.6% | 196 | 24.0% | 9.4% | 1.85 |
| Lovers Lane & Sunnock | 1485 | 15.6% | 69 | 23.2% | NA | NA |
| Main & Catherine | 1693 | 14.6% | 359 | 28.1% | 13.5% | 2.29 |
| Michigan & Lafayette | 1853 | 11.6% | 891 | 17.7% | 6.1% | 1.64 |
| Park & Patterson | 2244 | 52.6%[24] | 1897 | 76.8% | 24.2% | 2.98 |
| Portage & Stockbridge | 1194 | 30.9% | 1930 | 46.7% | 15.8% | 1.96 |
| Stadium & Rambling | 2002 | 12.6% | 391 | 19.7% | 7.1% | 1.70 |
| Whites & Bronson | 1968 | 9.1% | 363 | 17.6% | 8.5% | 2.13 |

**Table 3.  Benchmark and Stop Ns, Percentages and Odds Ratios for Black Motorists.**

It is clear that all of the odds ratios indicate some level of concern, although the one at Kilgore and Milham Park just reaches that level.  However, all of the other locations suggest either that the department should carefully scrutinize that area or that  a problem does exist. Particularly concerning is the one at Park and Patterson, as it is significantly higher than any of the others. The weighted average (by number of stops) odds ratio for all 11 locations is 2.32, which indicates that targeting is occurring.

These data suggest that throughout the city, but particularly in the north portion of the city too many Black motorists are being stopped.  These results should be carefully considered by KDPS and changes made in the culture of the organization to assure that this situation does

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[24]  This benchmark percentage here is somewhat higher than the benchmark  than the percentage reported in Table 1. because the two roads had markedly different Black traffic and the vast majority of stops occurred between 3:00 PM and 3:00 AM when the Black percentage of motorists is higher.

not persist.  This is a difficult and time consuming activity, but must be undertaken by KDPS if it

is to repair its relationship with the Black citizens of Kalamazoo.

The picture is quite different when we consider Hispanic motorists.  There were only 4

intersections where there were enough stops of Hispanics to have a sample size that was stable

enough for analysis.  Table 4 presents the data for those 4 locations.

| Location | Benchmark N | Benchmark Hispanic | Stop N | Stop % Hispanic | Disparity | Odds Ratio |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Burdick & Richard | 569 | 5.4% | 788 | 5.3% | -0.1% | 0.98 |
| Kalamazoo & Westnedge | 1514 | 3.6% | 3402 | 2.5% | -1.1% | 0.69 |
| Park & Patterson | 2244 | 2.9% | 1897 | 1.7% | -1.2% | 0.58 |
| Portage & Stockbridge | 1194 | 8.7% | 1930 | 10.5% | 1.8% | 1.23 |

**Table 4.  Hispanic Benchmarks, Stops and Odds Ratios.**

Only one of the odds ratios is above one (Portage and Stockbridge), which falls in the

benign area.  The weighted (by stops) odds ratio for Hispanic stops is 0.82.  This suggests that

there is no targeting of Hispanic motorists by KDPS and is exactly what would be expected on

the basis of the benchmarks.


## *Post Stop Activity*

Post Stop Activity refers to what occurs after the stop has been made.  For purposes of

this study we look at citations, an officers request that the motorist exit the vehicle, whether the

motorist was handcuffed or not, whether the motorist, vehicle or both were searched and whether

the motorist was arrested.  With regard to searches, we concentrate on those in which the officer

had discretion in deciding whether a search was to occur.  Searches which are mandatory, that is those incident to arrest or in which the vehicle was impounded, are not included.

As many of these activities are rare, we change our focus from specific locations to all stops made by KDPS during the year long data collection period.  The universe of stops that we consider are all 17,695 stops KDPS made from March 1, 2012 to February 28, 2013.  Table 5 contains the raw data for each of the post stop activities by race/ethnicity.

| Activity | Asian | Black | Hispanic | Other | White | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Stops | 105 (0.59%) | 7229 (40.9%) | 675 (3.8%) | 504 (2.8%) | 9182 (51.9%) | 17,695 |
| Citations | 54 (0.65%) | 3127 (37.8%) | 324 (3.9%) | 279 (3.4%) | 4497 (54.3%) | 8,281 |
| Exit Vehicle | 6 (0.22%) | 1462 (53.7%) | 99 (3.6%) | 61 (2.2%) | 1094 (40.19%) | 2,722 |
| Handcuffed | 0 | 878 (64.7%) | 58 (4.2%) | 22 (1.6%) | 398 (29.4%) | 1,356 |
| Searched | 2 (0.2%) | 580 (53.4%) | 32 (3.0%) | 20 (1.9%) | 441 (41.0%) | 1,075 |
| Hits | 1 | 164 | 11 | 7 | 148 | 331 |
| Hit Rate | | 28.3% | 34.4% | 35.0% | 33.6% | |
| Arrests | 0 | 316 (64.2%) | 15 (3.0%) | 3 (0.6%) | 158 (32.1%) | 492 |

**Table 5. Raw Data and Percentages for Post Stop Activity by Race/Ethnicity**

The Benchmark for each of these activities should be the percentage of each race/ethnicity stopped.  The one analysis reported in Table 5 which is not based on the percentage of that race/ethnicity stopped is the Hit Rate, which is based on the percentage of searches of a specific race/ethnicity.

Relative to the percentage of Black motorists stopped fewer are given citations, more are asked to exit the vehicle and searched, and considerably more Black motorists are handcuffed and arrested than are stopped.  However, when we look at the percentage of motorists who are

carrying contraband we find that the group that is searched most--by quite a large amount--is least likely to be carrying contraband. This is true whether we view these numbers in relation to their presence among those stopped, searched and even more so their presence in traffic[25].

The fact that fewer Black motorists are given citations--which is statistically significant--may be troubling in this context. These results suggest that a different and less stringent standard may be used to stop Black motorists than is used to stop motorists of other race/ethnicities. Results such as these have certainly been seen in other traffic stop studies. While we cannot say that different standards are being used to stop Black motorists, we suggest the KDPS looks into this possibility.

The results with regard to being asked to exit the vehicle, being handcuffed, searched and arrested are also concerning. It is apparent that Black motorists are more likely to be subjected to all four and all analyses are highly statistically significant. KDPS should carefully consider why this is happening and whether these numbers are consistent with its existing policies.

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[25] We do not have an accurate measure of Black traffic citywide. We do know what the Black traffic is at the 12 locations that were benchmarked. Given the data we have, it is probably safe to say that Black motorists make up approximately 20% of the traffic around the city.

## CONCLUSIONS

The results of our study of KDPS are clear, unequivocal and systemic--a disproportionate number of Black motorists are being stopped and upon being stopped are much more likely to be asked to exit their vehicle, to be handcuffed, searched and arrested.  While the results of the study are very important, the context of the study is more important than the results and the steps taken in response to those results are the most important of all.

This is a study and an endeavor that KDPS and the city government of Kalamazoo decided to pursue because they thought it was the right thing to do.  They realized that the relationship between KDPS and the communities of color in Kalamazoo was vitally important for both KDPS and the city and for that proactive approach they are to be commended.

This is a time of reflection and concern for the KDPS, the African American Community and indeed, the whole city of Kalamazoo.  It is also an exciting and promising time if the KDPS and the community coalesce and realize that the results of the study are important primarily as a springboard towards moving forward.

The leadership of KDPS and the City of Kalamazoo has made it clear to us that targeting of Black motorists is unacceptable and must change.  They have been insistent that they want Lamberth Consulting to make recommendations that will ultimately lead to lasting change in the way KDPS conducts stops of its citizens and views/ treats the African American population in Kalamazoo.  To an extent that we have not seen in the numerous police departments for which we have conducted assessments over the last 15 years, Kalamazoo leaders are open to changing the way they conduct themselves.

Prior to making those recommendations we need to make some observations about what the results of the study mean. First and foremost, the community and KDPS should understand that the most important change that must occur is in the culture of KDPS. KDPS is not unique among police departments in the United States in that they share societal stereotypes about African American citizens. The first step in changing police culture means that all policies and procedures of the department must be carefully reviewed and assessed for bias against African Americans specifically and all persons generally, either explicit or implicit. For example, KDPS officers choose to search approximately 6% of the motorists they stop and the majority of them are African American. KDPS should carefully review its policy on searches and assure that there are objective criteria required as a threshold for initiating high officer discretion searches.

Equally or possibly even more important, is the requirement that the agency clearly and consistently communicate to all members of KDPS that, moving forward, the KDPS culture will be defined as much by the changes to department protocols, including revisions to policies and procedures as by its rich history. The KDPS system of rewards and recognition (formal and informal) must be included in the overall agency evaluation and change effort. We say this to emphasize the fact that, in our view, the culture of a police department is so powerful that it overcomes the influence of the cultures from which its officers come. To change the culture of KDPS, the entire agency, including the Chief, the Command Staff, the public safety officers, front line supervisors and possibly most important of all its Field Training Officers   must commit to examining every aspect of the organization, challenging traditional processes, practices and assumptions and implementing and sustaining all necessary changes..

As KDPS scrutinizes and makes changes from within, the reflexive response by the community of labeling officers of KDPS biased against African Americans, even racists, should

be avoided.  There are many reasons for officers to stop minority motorists that have everything

to do with the culture of the organization.  For example, many police officers believe the societal

(police) stereotype that African Americans are more likely to be carrying contraband than are

White motorists.  While the data from this study belie that stereotype in Kalamazoo, the officers

of KDPS are only now being introduced to those data. As certain arrests receive greater

recognition than others in KDPS and that will continue, an officer who believes that he or she is

more likely to make an arrest by stopping a Black motorist is not necessarily showing an animus

towards Blacks, but rather a desire to be positively acknowledged by their peers, agency leaders

or possibly get ahead in the organization.  One of the changes in KDPS culture to which we refer

is to develop an approach that recognizes officers whose actions are based on objective facts and

data, including the behavior of those who are stopped and not the officers subjective view of the

stopped individuals race, ethnicity or other distinguishing characteristics.  This is but one of the

ways in which KDPS must change its culture.

It was only about 15 years ago that data from any police department were introduced

showing that African Americans are no more likely to carry contraband than are white

motorists.[26]  KDPS and its officers are not the only ones in American policing who were and

continue to be surprised by this result.  Indeed American society has accepted a stereotype of

African American young men as perpetrators of crime and this stereotype is supported by their

numbers who are accused, arrested and incarcerated.  Unfortunately too few police departments

have engaged in a thorough study of themselves to determine whether and to what degree their

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[26] Report of John Lamberth, Ph. D. in the case of Wilkins vs. Maryland State Police.  Available at:
       www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/Public/PN-MD/0003.0006.pdf

own policies and procedures are inflating these numbers.  It is precisely this task which KDPS

has agreed to pursue.

KDPS, the city and its African American citizens should be aware that the stereotypes

and misconceptions, as well as the culture that undergirds the targeting of Black motorists did

not come into being overnight and they cannot be changed with nearly the immediacy that

KDPS, the city and its citizens would like.     Hopefully the citizens, particularly the African

American citizens of Kalamazoo will afford them that time.

In the 1980s a change began in social science research that has the promise of helping us

better understand our biases and more importantly to shed light upon how we should view the

results of the study of KDPS.  Based upon how we obtain and process information, implicit bias

suggests that we act upon information of which we are unaware[27].   The authors of a new book,

*Blind Spot,* say:

*What are the hidden biases of this book's title?  They are--for lack of a better term--bits*

*of knowledge about social groups.  These bits of knowledge are stored in our brains because we*

*encounter them so frequently in our environments.  Once lodged in our minds, hidden biases can*

*influence our behavior towards members of particular social groups, but we remain oblivious to*

*their influence.  Most people find it unbelievable that they can be guided by mental content of*

*which they are unaware.*

Police are not immune to these influences and implicit bias should be one of the

important components of both KDPS's self study and the community's reaction to it.  The fact is

that none of us are immune to stereotypes and that changing those biases is quite difficult.  Yet it

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[27] Banaji, M. R. & Greenwald, A. G.  (2013) Blind Spot: Hidden Biases of Good People.  Delacorte Press, New York.

is important that they be changed and KDPS has agreed that implicit bias must be one of the components of training that officers receive. As part of that training the cold hard fact that proportionally more White than Black motorists are found with contraband upon being searched by KDPS officers must be thoroughly discussed with the officers. Further the implications of these results should be clearly understood.

We end this section with a tale of an agency who about a decade ago decided to change its policies with regard to searching people of color. In the late 1990's the Customs Bureau of the U.S Government faced harsh criticism as stories of impropriety in searching of women of color emerged. After studying this aspect of their operation, the Bureau instituted a number of changes which included approval from a supervisor for every search, an emphasis on behavioral indictors as a criterion for searches, and so forth before a search could be conducted. These policies reduced the number of searches by 70% while continuing to confiscate about the same amount of contraband.[28] This tale emphasizes that rethinking and revising an agency's culture makes both ethical and common sense.

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[28] For a more detailed account of this policy see: Harris, D. (2002). *Profiles in Injustice: Why Racial Profiling Cannot Work.* The New Press, New York, pp. 219ff.

# RECOMMENDATIONS

1. KDPS should immediately review and revise its policies and procedures with particular emphasis upon traffic stops and all interactions with citizens.  This review should be primarily concerned with any activities that may lead to excess enforcement activities with African American citizens.

2.   A process for on-going evaluation and adjustment of the KPDS reward and recognition system (formal or informal ) should be developed and implement for purposes of assuring that staff are not rewarded or encouraged, either explicitly or implicitly for racial/ethnic targeting rather than behavioral targeting.

3. KDPS should continue to collect data on all traffic stops utilizing the software that was instituted for this study.  In addition, the department should consider adding pedestrian contacts and any other high discretion (K-9 request, consent searches) enforcement activity to the data collection process.

4. KDPS should implement a process requiring enhanced management of all special investigative or enforcement patrols targeting crime reduction in specific areas of Kalamazoo. Enhanced management techniques should include supervisory evaluation of KPDS officer's decision-making and enforcement actions relative to traffic stop activities

5. KDPS should develop a policy providing general guidelines with regard to citing or not citing motorists who are stopped, when occupants can or should be asked to exit their vehicle, handcuffed, or searched.  With regard to searches a clear policy should be developed providing decision-making criteria for discretionary searches.  The policy should also describe supervisor responsibilities for evaluating and providing staff feedback relative to post stop activities.

6. After the review and revision of policy and procedures is completed KDPS should provide a carefully tailored training course for its Command Staff, front line supervisors and officers aimed at the following objectives:

    a. Helping officers understand the results of this study and the meaning of those results for them as officers and supervisors of KDPS.

    b. What changes are being initiated in policies and procedures and why they are being initiated.

    c. Training on behavioral profiling and how it is a more efficient crime detection technique.

    d. An emphasis on community engagement and methods to enlist community assistance in solving crimes.

     e.   Implicit bias and how it effects policing.

7. KDPS should institute an "early warning" system with regard to stops made by its officers. Supervisors and officers should review all stops on a regular basis to determine how each officer compares to other officers who are "similarly situated" and department expectations.

8. KDPS should regularly report to its members and the citizens of Kalamazoo on the progress of its cultural change initiative.  A comprehensive stakeholder report should  be scheduled for sometime in early 2015 (this timing should give the corrective actions implemented time to begin to have an effect) and provide data and analysis on the following: proportion of motorists stopped, with a specific focus on African Americans, individuals cited, asked to exit their vehicles, handcuffed and searched.  It should be emphasized that neither KDPS nor the community should expect that all targeting effects will be erased in this short time period.

## APPENDIX

## *Maps of Surveyed Deployed Intersections*

### 1. Burdick & Richard

## 2. Cork & Redmond



## 3. Kalamazoo & Westnedge

## 4. Kilgore & Milham Park



## 5. KL & Little

## 6. Lovers Lane & Sunnock



## 7. Main & Catherine

## 8.  Michigan & Lafayette



## 9.  Park & Patterson

## 10. Portage & Stockbridge



## 11. Stadium & Rambling

## 12. Whites & Bronson